Archive for June, 2011

Is China’s electricity shortage be the trigger for a crash?

Tuesday, June 28th, 2011

As you read the mainstream media, you will find that more and more attention are paid to the fundamentals of China’s economy. Recently, reports of Chinese ghost cities made its way to the newspapers and TV news reports. Attention are brought into the inflation problem that China is facing, and the efforts by the authorities to clamp down on the property bubble that are brought about by real estate speculation. Then we hear reports on the MSM of characters like Jim Chanos, who famously made the claim that China is Dubai times 1000. So, it is fair to say the mainstream is catching on the scepticism of China’s economic ‘miracle’.

While it is true that the mountains of bad debts, excesses, bubbles, corruption and price inflation in the Chinese economy are unsustainable in the long run, it is another matter to predict when this unsustainable trend will result in an almighty crash. As Professor Chovanec put it astutely, China’s bubble is “extremely persistent,” though he is careful to qualify that that it is by no means sustainable.

So, a week ago, when we saw this news article about electricity shortages, we wondered whether a hard landing for China is near? As that BBC article reported,

Offices and shopping malls in the Chinese city of Shanghai will be urged to close their doors on the hottest days of the year this summer.

The power rationing is necessary due to the country’s shortage of electricity.

The electricity grid serving China’s financial hub does not have the capacity to meet peak demand the authorities say.

China has been coping with power shortages since March, because of coal supply problems and a drought.

If you are curious about the answer to this question, our friend, Paul Adkins, from AZ-China had completed an in-depth study of the situation in China this summer, as the country runs out of electricity. (You can order this report by contacting them on their web site. And note that we do NOT receive any commissions for any sales of their report.) We have read the report and can only provide you with our interpretation of the most important facts…

This is not the first time China is suffering from power shortage. The last it happened was “especially in 2004, but also in 2006 and 2008.” Today, the primary reason for the electricity shortage is the high price of coal. Coal is the main input cost of producing electricity in China. Unfortunately for the power generator, the price of electricity in China is capped by government decree.

The result?

As AZ-China’s study reported,

High coal prices and relatively lower electricity price increases have combined to deteriorate the fiscal situation of power producers, making power plants lose motivation to increase capacity utilization.

Now, the current ‘shortage’ of electricity is not due to a real physical shortage. The power generators, in fact, have excess spare capacity. As the study continued,

The utilization of thermal generators has not reached the historical maximum point.

Utilization hours of thermal power equipment was 5,031 hours in 2010, 16% lower than 5,991 hours in 2004, indicating the [Independent Power Producers] IPPs can improve utilization. On a theoretical basis at least, they can fill the power supply gap; it should only be a matter of time before the National Development and Reform Commission releases policies for stimulating increased power generation.

And here is a very interesting dynamic that is happening in China. As Paul Adkins wrote in his blog article,

The electricity generation companies have been baulking at paying the high price, and running only on contract coal, which they purchase for a much lower cost.That?s on the surface, but there?s more to it. The power generation companies certainly buy coal at a lower price than the spot market. But here?s the rub. They are re-selling their coal back into the spot market. they take as much coal as the contracts allow, then sell ?surplus? coal. In some cases, their reported profits have come more from reselling than from power generation.

So, the power generator ran out of coal, but it becomes the Government’s problem.

Now, you may wonder, in an authoritarian country, why don’t the government order the power producers to produce more and solve the problem at a stroke?

Well, here is the power of incentive at work. As Paul wrote in his blog article,

Because the key people in every layer of management are measured by the Communist Party?s Organisation Department, using profit growth as the key measure. Careers are at stake, but they are built not by doing what is best for the country in some altruistic way, but through turning in a report card that shows you made money during your tenure in that job.

Once you understand the situation, you will be able to understand that the present electricity shortage is due to economic policy screw up, not due to an actual physical shortage.

Hence, the quickest remedy the government can make to alleviate the situation is to raise the price of electricity. But wouldn’t this result in rising price inflation? The short answer we can give you from reading AZ-China’s report,

A moderate power price rise won?t be a great influence on CPI.

That’s the good news. The bad news is that this is a temporary fix for 2011. The problem is in 1 to 2 years time,

… as the failure to keep investing in thermal power generation creates an ever-larger gap with demand.

That’s when the real physical shortage will occur.

So, if someone’s going to short China today on the basis of the present electricity shortage, we wish them good luck!

Does house price crash follow unemployment or is it the other way?

Wednesday, June 8th, 2011

One of the most common idea floating around in Australia is that as long as unemployment rate does not spike, mortgage defaults will not rise and consequently house prices will not crash from mass foreclosure selling.

That idea, taken in isolation, is self-evidently true. But is it logically correct to leap from this idea and jump to the idea that as long as the tide of unemployment holds low, there wouldn’t be a housing crash in Australia?

To answer this question, let’s take a read at this interesting article from MacroBusiness,

Australian banks pretty much only know how to lend against property. From time to time they rabbit on about lending against cash flow, but the truth is they do not have the skills. They vanished in the 1990s when merchant banks started disappearing. ?Investment banks are just financial tricksters fiddling with assets. As we see with Macquarie?s fate, they do not know how to invest in real businesses that achieve steady growth from serving customers.

There has been a sharp rise in business credit for SMEs since the mid 1990s, which pretty much tracks the property asset bubble.?In 1996 it was about $13 billion, two thirds of which was secured against property. By 2008 it was $63 billion, 75% of which was secured against property. In 2010, it fell to $56 billion. Again, about 75% is secured against property. About two thirds is secured against residential property.

This level is high by developed world standards. According to the World Bank,the average for developed economies is to have 56% of SME loans secured against property.

Banks are still lending, but mostly only where the loan is fully secured by tangible assets and personal guarantees (and, in some cases, key man insurance). Where there is an existing loan, banks are requiring additional security. Members stated that lenders were no longer prepared t provide finance on ?soft? security ? such as cash flow or good will (unsecured finance) ? as had been available pre-GFC.

In Australia, residential properties underpin much of the collateral for SME loans. The implication of a decline in house prices is the reduction in the value of the loan collateral. That will result in a tightening of credit. A precipitous decline in house prices will result in a credit crunch for SME. A credit crunch for SME will result in cash-flow problems, which in turn will result in mass layoffs (i.e. higher unemployment). A decline in house prices will also sap away consumer confidence via thewealth effects, which in turn will drain consumer spending out of the economy, which in turn will result in high unemployment in the retail sector.

So, the first round of impact from falling house prices will be rising unemployment. That will feed into the second round of impact of lower house prices, which in turn lead to further rising unemployment. This will feed into the? third round of impact.

Also, falling house prices can happen at the margins. You don’t need a mass selling panic to trigger a fall in house price. As we wrote inSpectre of deflation,

One thing many people fail to understand is that values of financial assets can vanish as easily as they are created in the first place. It is a fallacy to believe that just because money has to move somewhere from one asset class to another, the overall valuation in the financial system cannot contract. The very fact that all the money in the world cannot buy up all capitalisation is proof of that fact. This leads us to the next question: how do financial assets derive their value?

As we mentioned in The Bubble Economy, we have to understand the principle of imputed valuation. Suppose you have a house which you bought for $100,000. What happens if one day, your neighbour decide to sell his house (which is similar to yours) for $120,000? When that happens, your house would have to be re-valued upwards to $120,000 even though you had done absolutely nothing. The same goes for stocks. All it needs for a stock to increase in value is for a pair of buyer and seller to transact at a higher price. As long as the other shareholders do absolutely nothing, that higher price will be imputed into the values of the rest of the stocks. Thus, when asset values rise, all it takes is a handful of them to trade at higher prices in order for the rest to be re-valued upwards. If assets can ?increase? in value that way, it can ?decrease? in value that way too.

To put it simply, credit drives house prices, which in turn drives credit. Falling house prices will drain credit, which in turn pushes down house prices.